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NOTES
should work when the seller is in bad faith,5 8 but here also the
opinion does not show a basis for the holding. Possible hardships
caused by the holdings of older cases when applied to automobile
sales might have persuaded the courts to alter their positions.
The fact that an automobile's value depreciates so quickly focuses
attention on the seller's situation in redhibition.54 The result in
these two cases are correct, but the courts in the future should
reconsider the nature of the redhibitory action in developing
sound legal foundations for their conclusions.
Michael G. Page
TORTS OFFSHORE-THE RODRIGUE
INTERPRETATION OF THE LANDS ACT
An offshore worker fell to his death on the floor of an arti-
ficial island more than one marine league off the Louisiana gulf
shore. Decedent's widow and two children brought actions in
the federal district court for the eastern district of Louisiana
based on the Death on the High Seas Act' (hereinafter the
"Seas Act") and Louisiana's general tort recovery statute2 al-
legedly made applicable by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act8 (hereinafter the "Lands Act"). The district court reasoned
that since the Seas Act provided a federal remedy inconsistent
with the Louisiana statute, the latter could not be urged via the
Lands Act.4 That portion of the actions based on the Louisiana
statute was dismissed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's dismissal." Certiorari was granted in
this and a closely analogous case," and the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that petitioners' remedy was under the Lands
53. The court apparently took into account the buyer's extravagant
claims for damages in computing the fair rental value of the car. To avoid
theoretical confusion, perhaps it would be advantageous for the court to
compute fair use value and damages to be paid the buyer separately. See
note 47 supra.
54. See Gauche v. Ford Motor Co., 226 So.2d 198, 207 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969). The court treated depreciation and the buyer's use as interchangeable
terms.
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1920).
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.
3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1953).
4. Id. § 1333(a) (2) provides: "To the extent that they are applicable and
not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regu-
lations . . . , the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State , . . are de-
clared to be the law of the United States for . . . the subsoil and seabed of
the Outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures
thereon .... " (emphasis added).
5. 395 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968).
6. Dore v. Link Belt Co., 391 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Act and Louisiana law made applicable thereby. Rodrigue v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
The area affected by the instant case includes all the conti-
nental shelf lying seaward from coastal state boundaries. 7 Ascer-
taining the law applicable to workers injured while engaged in
the extraction of minerals in this area has been primarily a mat-
ter of defining the worker's status at the time of injury. This
process of definition has traditionally involved not only the
duties assigned the worker, but also the type of structure upon
which he was injured or killed. For analytical purposes, offshore
oil field workers can be divided into two categories, seamen
and non-seamen. Placement of the worker into one of these
categories determines the remedies available to him.
Initially the courts seemed confused as to whether classify-
ing a worker as a seaman was a question of fact or law. This
problem was finally decided in the 1950's to be one of fact,8 and
the Fifth Circuit in Offshore Co. v. Robison9 set broad, flexible
guidelines to assist the jury in determining this question. A
worker classified as a seaman can proceed under general mari-
time law and the Jones Act,10 which offer benefits not available
under local workmen's compensation statutes," or the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act 12 (hereinafter the Long-
shoremen's Act), a traditional compensation statute. Under
7. The total area of the Continental Shelf off the United States
shore (including Alaska) is estimated at 890,000 square miles. Omitting
Alaska, less than 10% lies within historic state boundaries. 2 U.S. CoDo
CoNG. & AD. NEws 2177 (1953). The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S. §§ 1301-
1315 (1953), fixes coastal state boundaries at three geographical miles from
a line representing the ordinary low water line unless the state was ad-
mitted to the union conditioned upon a more distant boundary. It is ap-
parently now settled that only Texas and Florida have valid claims outside
the three mile limit. United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967), rehearing
dernied, 389 U.S. 1059 (1968).
8. Comment, 27 LA. L. REv. 757, 763 (1967).
9. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959). "[Tjhere is an evidentlary basis for a
Jones case to go to the jury: (1) if there is some evidence that the injured
workman was assigned permanently to a vessel (including special purpose
structures not usually employed as a means of transport by water but de-
signed to float on water) or performed a substantial part of his work on the
vessel; and (2) if the capacity in which he was employed or the duties which
he performed contributed to the function of the vessel or to the accomplish-
ment of its mission in terms of maintenance during its movement or during
anchorage for its future trips." Id. at 779. The latest development in de-
fining workers as seamen was in Producer's Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d
432 (5th Cir. 1966), where it was recognized that in appropriate cases the
worker could get a directed verdict or summary judgment on the question
of status.
10. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
11. E.g., LA. R.S. 23:1021-1351 (Supp. 1968).
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1927).
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general maritime law an injured seaman has an action against
his employer for maintenance and cure (no negligence need be
proven) which has been likened to a "non-statutory workmen's
compensation." The Jones Act allows the seaman, upon proving
his employer's negligence, to recover a lump sum for pain and
suffering, loss of past and future earnings, and residual dis-
ability. A seaman may couple his Jones Act claim with an inde-
pendent action against his employer based on the doctrine of
unseaworthiness which focuses attention on the condition of the
vessel rather than the amount of care exercised by the employer.
The use of these independent grounds does not permit double
recovery by the seaman, but it does enhance his chances of
recovery by providing a dual basis on which to hold his employer
liable. Therefore, the injured seaman has the opportunity of re-
covering compensation-type benefits without proving his em-
ployer's negligence; and he can further recover upon proving
either his employer's negligence, or the unseaworthiness of the
vessel.18
The first legislation treating those workers not classified as
seamen was the Seas Act which limited its coverage to pecuniary
loss for wrongful deaths occurring on the high seas.14 Prior to
its passage admiralty courts compensated for this statutory void
by enforcing state wrongful death statutes. 5 The Longshore-
men's Act extended compensation coverage to those non-seamen
not covered by state compensation statutes.0 In 1953 the Lands
Act made its debut in this already confusing area providing fed-
eral legislation to cover non-seamen working on platforms perma-
nently fixed to the outer Continental Shelf. Although the Lands
Act was designed primarily to assert the federal government's
right to lease and develop the seabed and subsoil in the outer
Continental Shelf beyond state boundaries, 7 it purported to
13. For a more comprehensive comparison of relative benefits afforded
by this legislation, see Comment, 27 LA. L. REv. 757 (1967).
14. See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1986).
15. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
16. Weiss v. Central R.R. of N.J., 235 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1956): "[Ilt
was the purpose of the Longshoremen's Act to provide recovery for long-
shoremen and harbor workers previously unable to obtain it under state
compensation laws, but at the same time to leave distinct and unimpaired
the traditional rights and remedies of seamen, for whom maintenance and
cure had long served as a kind of non-statutory workmen's compensation."
17. 2 U.S. CoDe CONG. & AD. NEws 2177 (1953): "The purpose of H.R. 5134
(Lands Act) is to amend the Submerged Lands Act in order that the area
in the outer Continental Shelf beyond boundaries of the States may be
leased and developed by the Federal Government. At the present time the
submerged Lands Act merely established that the seabed and subsoil in the
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establish a body of criminal and civil law to govern this area
and the fixed structures thereon.18
The provision in the Lands Act adopting all adjacent state
criminal and civil law not inconsistent with existing federal laws
did not receive close judicial scrutiny until 1961 in Pure Oil Co.
v. Snipes.19 In Snipes, plaintiff was severely injured while fall-
ing from a water tank through the floor of an artificial island
located about sixty-five miles off the Louisiana coast. Since the
action was brought twenty-two months later, the specific issue
to be decided was whether a local statute dictating that tort
actions prescribe in one year 20 or the equitable doctrine of laches
controlled. The court assured Snipes' recovery by holding that
the law governing the outer Continental Shelf was the "per-
outer Continental Shelf beyond State boundaries appertained In the United
States and was subject to its jurisdiction and control.
18. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1333 (1953): "§ 1332-Congressional declaration of
policy.
"(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States
and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as pro-
vided in this subchapter.
'1 1333. Laws and regulations governing lands.
"(a) Constitution and United States laws; laws of adjacent States; pub-
lication of projected State lines; restriction on State taxation and jurisdic-
tion.
"(1) The Constitution and laws and civil political jurisdiction of the
United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Conti-
nental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures which may be
erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and
transporting resources therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer Conti-
nental shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a
State; Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer Continental
Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the provisions of this sub-
chapter.
"(2) To the extent that they are applicable and not Inconsistent with
this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary
now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each ad-
jacent State as of the effective date of this subchapter are declared to be the
law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected
thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were
extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and
the President shall determine and publish In the Federal Register such
projected lines extending seaward and defining each such area. All of such
applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers
and courts of the United States. State taxation laws shall not apply to the
outer Continental Shelf.
"(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law as the law
of the United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any
interest In or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over the
seabed and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the property and nat-
ural resources thereof or the revenues therefrom."
19. 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
20. L& Civ. CoD art. 3536.
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vasive maritime law," which precluded application of the local
prescriptive statute.21 This holding had considerable impact on
subsequent tort22 and compensation 23 litigation.
The Rodrigue decision, by holding that petitioners' remedy
was under the Lands Act and applicable Louisiana law, effec-
tively undercut the reasoning of Snipes and those cases relying
on the Snipes rule that general maritime law governed the area
encompassed by the Lands Act.24 Justice White determined that
the clear meaning of the language of the Lands Act was to make
the affected area subject to the jurisdiction, control, and power
of disposition of the federal government as if it were a "federal
enclave" in an upland state. The adjacent states' laws were
federalized as of the effective date of the act, but only to "the
extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with . . .
other Federal laws. '25 This, reasoned the Court, had the effect
of adopting adjacent state law as surrogate federal law to fill
the legal gaps inherent in our federal system.26 The Court then
determined that the Seas Act did not apply as it redressed only
those deaths "occurring on the high seas." Finally the Court
21. Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1961). In affirming the
district court's judgment that the local prescriptive statute did not apply,
the court said: "At the heart of this appeal is the question whether under
the [Lands Act], . . . the applicable substantive law for an injury received
in connection with a fixed offshore platform is that of Louisiana, the ad-
jacent state, or general maritime law."
The court concluded that "a consideration of both intrinsic and extrinsic
factors requires the conclusion that it was the intention of Congress that
(a) this occurrence be governed by Federal, not State, law, and (b) that the
Federal law thereby promulgated would be the pervasive maritime law of
the United States." Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., Loffiand Bros. Co. v. Roberts, 386 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1040 (1968), where an injured worker on a fixed plat-
form more than three miles off Louisiana's coast was not barred from re-
covery by Louisiana law pertaining to contributory negligence because federal
6maritime law applied. Movible Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.
1965) held that since federal maritime law applied to offshore workers, the
doctrine of comparative negligence, not assumption of risk, applied.
23. See, e.g., Tate, J., concurring in Crooks v. American Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 173 So.2d 875 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). Cf. Landry, J., who, while dis-
senting in Gravois v. Travelers Indem. Co., 173 So.2d 550 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965), concedes the exclusiveness of the Longshoremen's Act In these situ-
ations, but vigorously maintains that the state has concurrent jurisdiction in
third party actions provided thereby.
24. See notes 22, 23 supra.
25. See 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1953), quoted at note 18 supra.
26. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 357 (1969).
27. To buttress this contention the Court noted that in the past, ad-
miralty jurisdiction had not applied to fixed structures unless they were
erected as navigational aids or had been in a collision with a ship. Id. at 360.
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concluded that Congress specifically intended that the general
maritime law not apply to the affected area.2s
The apparent effect of Rodrigue is to preclude application of
the Seas Act to these offshore artificial islands encompassed by
the Lands Act, thus allowing the non-seamen (or their survivors)
injured thereon broader possibilities for recovery. However, the
gain in benefits may be more apparent than real since Snipes
and its progeny are now questionable precedents. It now appears
that prescriptive yardstick for initiating tort actions is that of
the adjacent state.29 It could also be argued that contributory
negligence and assumption of risk doctrines are now applicable
instead of the plaintiff-oriented comparative negligence doctrine
of admiralty." Certainly those maintaining that workers who
are hired in Louisiana should have a choice of compensation
remedies (Longshoremen's Act or state workmen's compensation
statutes) will have a stronger position from which to argue.81
Today, American workers in the mineral extractive indus-
tries are covered by compensation remedies whether they are
classed as seamen or non-seamen regardless of where they are
injured or killed as long as it is within the scope of their em-
ployment.3 2 However, there is a disparity of remedies available
to these workers who attempt to gain additional recovery based
on negligence. 83 The non-seaman is limited by workmen's com-
pensation legislation to negligence actions against third parties.
The seaman, on the other hand, has the right to seek redress
not only from negligent third parties under general maritime
law, but also from his negligent employer via the Jones Act or
general maritime law, or both. Other relative disadvantages the
non-seaman faces in maintaining negligence actions are his ap-
28. At the time of the act's formulation, many of its proponents thought
that admiralty would be the most suitable body of law for this area. How-
ever, consideration for the close ties the thousands of offshore workers had
with adjacent states, coupled with admiralty's Inappositeness to mineral
law, caused all references to maritime law to be excluded in the final act.
"The very decision to [treat activity on these artificial islands as though
it occurred on ship] in the initial bill recognized that If it were not adopted
explicitly, maritime law simply would not apply to these stationary struc-
tures not erected as navigational aids." Id. at 361-62 (emphasis added).
29. See note 20 supra. In Mississippi personal injury and wrongful death
actions are prescribed in six years, 1A Miss. Coow ANN. § 722 (1942), and
in Texas in two years, 16A Tsx. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1925).
30. See note 22 supra.
31. See note 23 supra.
32. In Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Corp., 170 So.2d 518 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1965), plaintiff, who contracted his employment in Louisiana, was
held entitled to receive state compensation even though injured in Arabia.
33. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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parent subjection to the doctrines of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk. Both the Jones Act and general mari-
time law spare the seaman from these possible bars to recovery
by affording him the benefit of the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence.84 Perhaps the most startling disparateness involves the
wrongful death remedy available to the non-seaman's survivors
when the non-seaman is killed while traveling between the rig
and the adjacent state boundary. 5 The non-seaman's wrongful
death coverage is limited to pecuniary loss from the moment he
steps off the platform until he is within the adjacent state's
boundary.8
The situation as it now exists is not supportable on any
reasonable basis and may involve denial of equal protection of
the law to non-seamen. Extension of Jones Act coverage to non-
seamen is probably undesirable considering the substantial in-
creased social cost that would result. Nevertheless, the relative
hazards faced by these groups of men do not differ perceptibly
and do not justify such disparate treatment. A reasonable solu-
tion to the problem would be remedial federal legislation de-
signed to extend the coverage presently offered by the Lands
Act to non-seaman, fixed-platform workers to include all mis-
haps occurring while in the scope of their employment over the
34. See note 22 supra. The Jones Act gave seamen the same benefits
afforded railway workers by the Federal Employers' Liability Act including
the doctrine of comparative negligence. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 36 Stat. 291 (1910),
53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1948). This doctrine, while reducing
the amount recoverable by a contributorily negligent seaman, does not act
as a complete bar to his recovery. In fact, the proviso of 45 U.S.C. § 53
(1948) eliminates even a diminution of damages if the employer is guilty of
violating any statute enacted for the safety of the employees.
35. Under the provisions of the Jones Act, a seaman is covered as long
as he is within the scope of his employment. Magnolia Towing Co. v. Pace,
378 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1967) held that the Jones Act applied when a seaman
was injured in an auto accident in the vicinity of Vicksburg, Mississippi,
while en route to his tugboat. Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961)
concerned a non-seaman who was killed in a helicopter crash just after
take-off from a fixed platform. The Court held, in effect, that the law gov-
erning decedent changed after the helicopter left the platform. See the re-
marks of the Court In Rodrigue approving this concept. Rodrigue v. Aetna
Cas. & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 359 (1969).
36. Under the Seas Act the successful plaintiff is limited to a recovery
of pecuniary loss which excludes recovery for such items as conscious suffer-
ing between injury and death, funeral expenses, and grief or loss of society
and companionship. "Award should be based on present value of pecuniary
benefits that would have resulted from continued life of deceased." Peterson
v. United New York Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 17 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.N.Y.
1936). In Rodrigue the Court remarked that "if the . . . Seas Act [were]
applicable . . . , the artificial Island worker would be entitled to far less
comprehensive remedies in many cases than he is now." Rodrigue v. Aetna
Cas. & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 361 (1969).
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outer Continental Shelf. This limited "scope of employment"
addition need not encroach on the adjacent state's jurisdiction.
Non-seamen would receive basically the same coverage if injured
or killed within the state boundaries. Man's exploitation of the
wealth of natural resources off our nation's shores will send ever-
increasing numbers of non-seaman workers into this harsh en-
vironment, and the protection of them and their families should
be of prime importance to our lawmakers.
Ted A. Hodges
UNION USE OF AUTHORIZATION CARDS TO OBTAIN
RECOGNITION UNDER SECTION 8 (A) (5)
Members of Food Stores Employees Union, Local No. 347,
began an organizational drive with a view to election and cer-
tification as the representative of the employees of Gissel Pack-
ing Company as provided in section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act.1 In the early stages of this effort, the employer
instituted his own vigorous antiunion campaign.2 Nevertheless,
a majority of the employees, 31 of the 47 in the bargaining unit,
signed union authorization cards.3 The company rejected the
demand for recognition and continued its assault by interrogating
employees, assuring higher wages if the company were not
unionized, and warning employees of dire effects if the union
were successful. Subsequently, the union filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges rather than seek an election. The three charges
alleged refusal to bargain,4 coercion of employees, 5 and a viola-
tion of section 8(a) (3)8 due to discharge of union adherents.
After the Board issued a bargaining order and after the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused enforcement, a writ
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1964).
2. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 580 n.1 (1969). Despite a
company vice-president's warning to two employees that union activity would
result in "you God-damned things" leaving, they attended a union meeting
at which a company agent was present and had their employment termi-
nated shortly thereafter.
3. The authorization cards distributed to the employees unambiguously
authorized the union to represent the signers as exclusive bargaining agent.
This is the single purpose type. The dual-purpose or ambiguous cards, which
the Court does not consider, contain statements that they may be used to
obtain a Board election or that they provide the union representative bar-
gaining status. It, however, does not take a strained reading of the decision
to be warned away from the use of such ambiguous cards.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
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